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Previous research on the importance of technology shocks in understanding the business
cycle emphasized the effects of neutral technological change that affects the production
of consumption and investment goods symmetrically. New research shows that investment-
specific, not neutral, technological change, embodied in the investment good itself
(a faster computer chip) or in the process for producing it, is a major source of the
business cycle.
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What drives the ups and downs in the
pace of aggregate economic activity we
call the business cycle? This is an endur-
ing question with critical implications
for determining the best approach to
monetary and fiscal pol-
icy. The purpose of this
Chicago Fed Letter is to re-
port on new research by
Fisher (2002), which sug-
gests that shocks to the
pace of technological




the effects of neutral
technological change
that affects the produc-
tion of consumption and
investment goods sym-
metrically. The new re-
search described in this
article suggests that a dif-
ferent kind of technolog-
ical progress, which is
embodied solely in new
investment goods, is crucial for under-
standing the business cycle.
Twenty years ago, most economists
viewed the business cycle as being driven
by “aggregate demand” shocks, arising
from waves of pessimism and optimism
(sometimes called “animal spirits”), or
monetary and fiscal policy. Implicit in
this theory is the view that business cy-
cles are pathological and should be off-
set by stabilization policy. This view of
business cycles was brought into question
in the 1980s by a group of researchers
who articulated an alternative view
called real business cycle (RBC) theory.
This theory says that the business cycle
is driven by shocks to the rate of neutral
technological change. To many econo-
mists this is an attractive theory because
it suggests that the business cycle is just
a part of the normal growth process.
However, the theory is controversial be-
cause, at least in its purest forms, it says
that any attempt to use stabilization
policy would be counterproductive be-
cause it would make people worse off.
RBC theory gained a lot of adherents
because an extensive body of research
shows that neutral technology shocks
can explain much of the fluctuations
in key macroeconomic variables. This
research is based on a methodology that
involves specifying parametric versions
of the standard growth model, assign-
ing plausible values to the parameters
in the model, and then generating data
from the model by simulating it. We then
judge a particular model by how well
the simulated data resembles actual
1. Equipment investment in the long run
logarithms
NOTE: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
SOURCES: Author’s calculations based data from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, and from
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real share
pricedata. The early research was quite lim-
ited in its scope, but over time the mod-
els were extended and many of the
substantive objections to the theory
were overcome. Indeed, by the time of
the review article by King and Rebelo
(1999),2 it is fair to say that research
based on simulating growth models had
established that neutral technology
shocks account for a significant fraction
of the business cycle.
In recent years, another body of re-
search has brought this view into doubt.
This research focuses on imposing a
reduced-form econometric assumption
implied by many RBC models. The spe-
cific assumption is that neutral techno-
logical change is the only source of
long-run changes in labor productivi-
ty. The standard methodology for eval-
uating RBC models involves being very
specific about the nature of the mech-
anism by which technology shocks are
propagated through the economy. One
desirable feature of the reduced-form
methodology is that it is consistent with
any propagation mechanism that can
be incorporated into an RBC model.
In this sense it is more general than the
typical RBC study. The reduced-form
approach was used by Galí (1999)3 to
show that neutral technological change
accounts for very little of the business
cycle variation in aggregate hours. Given
the generality of the approach and




The new research by Fisher
(2002) shows that the
Galí findings are special to
his consideration of just
neutral technological
change and that once








and Krusell (1997),4 re-
searchers have used evi-
dence on the secular
decline in the real investment price
to show that investment-specific, not neu-
tral, technological change, is the major
source of economic growth. This re-
search supports the view that the Galí-
style research may have ignored a
potentially important source of tech-
nology-driven business cycle variation,
namely that due to investment-specific
technology shocks.
Figure 1 shows why investment-specific
technological change may be important
for growth. The dashed line is the log
real price of investment goods. The real
price is a producer durable equipment
price deflator divided by a deflator for
consumption (see Fisher, 2002, for the
details on how the data described in this
article were constructed). According to
growth theory, this real price should be
an excellent measure of investment-spe-
cific technological change over long
horizons. Other things equal, an im-
provement in investment-specific tech-
nology (this could be embodied in the
investment good itself, such as in a com-
puter chip that runs faster than it did
before, or in the process for producing
new investment goods, such as in a bet-
ter machine for stamping parts for a
piece of capital equipment) should low-
er the cost of investment goods relative
to other goods. Figure 1 shows that the
real price fell about 200% over the pe-
riod 1955–2000, which is indicative of
substantial investment-specific techno-
logical progress.
The black line in figure 1 is the log real
share of investment in total output. It
measures the quantity of investment goods
produced in the economy relative to the
total amount of production in the econ-
omy measured in consumption units.
Growth theory predicts that if neutral
technological progress were the only
source of growth, then the real share
should be stationary. As the figure in-
dicates, there was a substantial increase
in the relative quantity of investment
goods produced over the period 1955–
2000. This is consistent with the decline
in the real price of investment goods. As
investment goods have become cheaper
relative to consumption goods, more
3. Dynamic responses to technology shocks
percent
SOURCES: Author’s calculations based data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Accounts, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and from Cummins and Violante (2002). See Fisher (2002) for
more details.
2. Equipment investment over the business cycle
percent
NOTE: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
SOURCES: Author’s calculations based data from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, and from
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of them have been produced relative
to consumption goods.
The evidence in figure 1 suggests that
there has been substantial investment-
specific technological progress and
that it has had a large impact on in-
vestment. Given that growth in part
depends on the accumulation of capi-
tal, this is suggestive of an important
role for investment-specific
technological change for
growth. Greenwood et al.
(1997) and Cummins and
Violante (2002)5 have dem-
onstrated that in fact the
contribution to growth in
per capita output of invest-
ment-specific technological
change is large—about 60%
of output growth can be at-
tributed to this kind of tech-
nological change. This is an
important finding because
the commonly held view
used to be that neutral tech-
nological change was the
main source of growth.
From the RBC perspective,
if investment-specific tech-
nological change is impor-
tant for growth, it could also
be important for business
cycles. Figure 2 presents data
that is suggestive of this be-
ing the case. This figure
displays real equipment in-
vestment and its real price
after detrending, so that it
shows only fluctuations as-
sociated with the business
cycle. The striking feature
of this figure is that invest-
ment and its price tend to
move in opposite direc-
tions. This is what one
should expect if supply
shocks are driving invest-
ment. An obvious possible
source of these supply




suggestive of a key role for
investment-specific techno-
logical change in driving business cycles.
Fisher (2002) assesses this possibility
by making two changes to the assump-
tions used by Galí to estimate the effects
of technology shocks. First, the assump-
tion that neutral technological change
is the only source of long-run changes
in labor productivity is modified to in-
clude the possibility that investment-
specific change also has an effect.
Second, investment-specific technologi-
cal change is assumed to be the unique
source of the secular trend in the real
price of investment goods. Fisher (2002)
argues that these assumptions are con-
sistent with the predictions of growth
theory and that they are sufficient to
identify the effects of both kinds of
technological change.
I now discuss one particular set of results
from Fisher (2002) to give a flavor of
that paper’s main findings. These results
are based on estimating a vector autore-
gression including growth in the real
investment price, growth in labor pro-
ductivity, and the log level of per-capita
hours worked and applying the two as-
sumptions described above to identify
neutral and investment-specific shocks.
Figure 3 suggests that the identified
shocks make sense from the perspective
of theory. This figure displays point es-
timates of the percentage responses of
the real equipment price, labor produc-
tivity, and per capita hours worked to
both kinds of technology shock. The
positive response of productivity to a
neutral shock in panel B is what defines
this shock. That hours respond positive-
ly to this shock is consistent with stan-
dard RBC models. Interestingly, the
investment price rises (its inverse falls)
after a positive neutral shock. This is
what one would expect in an RBC mod-
el with a rising short-run supply price
of capital, such as in the two-sector mod-
el in Christiano and Fisher (1998).6
4. Actual and technology-driven aggregate hours
log hours
NOTE: Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
SOURCES: Source: Author’s calculations based data from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Accounts, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and from
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A. Actual and investment-specific technology-driven
B. Actual and neutral technology-driven
log hours
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The responses to investment-specific
shocks in panel A are conditional on
the permanent and positive response
of the inverse equipment price. The pos-
itive response of hours is consistent with
the RBC models studied by Christiano
and Fisher (1998) and Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000).7 The
peak response of hours is four times
greater than the response of hours to
a neutral shock. After an initial increase,
productivity declines below zero before
rising to its long-run positive value. The
short-run decline in productivity is also
reasonable from the perspective of the-
ory, because investment takes time to
have an impact on the capital stock and
so productivity can be driven by hours
in the short run if the hours measure
responds strongly.
The responses of hours are broadly con-
sistent with theory, but are they of the
kind that can account for observed hours?
The weak response of hours to a neutral
shock is suggestive that this kind of shock
is unimportant for explaining the busi-
ness cycle. On the other hand, the strong
response of hours to an investment-
specific shock suggests this shock may be
important. Figure 4 illustrates the contri-
bution of the two shocks to the business
cycle. It shows historical decompositions
of hours due to investment-specific, neu-
tral, and both technology shocks, along
with the actual path of hours. Panel A
shows the investment-specific shock ac-
counts for a large part of the variation in
hours, particularly around recessions.
In striking contrast, neutral technology
shocks (panel B) seem almost unrelat-
ed to the business cycle. The combined
effects of the two shocks (panel C) track
actual hours quite closely.
Fisher (2002) reports that when the same
detrending procedure applied in figure 2
is applied to hours and the components
of hours driven by the technology shocks
shown in figure 4, then a bit more than
50% of the variation in hours can be
attributed to investment-specific shocks
but less than 5% can be attributed to the
neutral shocks. The implication seems
clear: technology shocks are important
for the business cycle and investment-
specific shocks are the most important
of the technology shocks considered.
Fisher (2002) shows that these results
are quite robust. Therefore, the results
strongly suggest that technology shocks
are important for understanding busi-
ness cycles. This is an important finding,
because it suggests that the RBC hypoth-
esis is very much alive. However, the
traditional focus of RBC research on
neutral technology shocks does not seem
right. The results suggest that future
research could benefit from being di-
rected toward studying investment-spe-
cific technological change.
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